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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Marissa Shannel Dempsey appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury

trial

verdicts

ﬁnding her guilty of eight counts of burglary, ﬁve counts 0f grand

counts of petit

theft;

Of The

Statement

and from the

Facts

district court’s

— p.343,

and three

order awarding restitution.

And Course Of The Proceedings

In the spring 0f 2017, eight residential burglaries

p.342, L. 1 8

theft,

were reported

in

Elmore County. (TL,

Based upon the geography of the burglaries and the method

L. 1 6.)

in

they were carried out, Det. Parlin, the investigating detective, believed them t0 be related.
p.343, L.2

— p.344,

L.2.)

Det. Parlin identiﬁed

Dempsey

as a suspect in the burglaries.

which
(T12,

(TL,

p.345, Ls.15-19.)

Property belonging t0 the burglary Victims was found in searches of Dempsey’s vehicle, a
storage shed rented

by Dempsey, and/or

owned by Jamie Shores —

a vehicle

the brother 0f

Dempsey’s boyfriend, Johnny Shores. (TL, p.327, L.21 — p.329, L.18; p.332, L.10 — p.333, L.23;
p.351, L.21

identiﬁed

—

p.358, L.23; p.361, L.22

Dempsey as being

at

—

p.362, L.8.)

Through police

0r near the scene 0f three 0f the eight

lineups, three individuals

homes

that

were burglarized.

(TL, p.166, L.16 —p.170, L.23; p.178, L.1 —p.180, L.17; p.377, L.16 —p.379, L.7.) In an interview,

Dempsey admitted

to Det. Parlin that she

committed burglaries, and

that she

had acted as a lookout for Jamie Shores When Shores

had been using methamphetamines during

p.322, Ls.2-10; p.327, Ls.10-14; p.368, Ls.4-14.)

Dempsey

this time.

(TL,

also asserted that she could not

remember most of the other

things Det. Parlin asked her about due to her drug use.

(TL, p.368,

Ls.15-22.)

The

state

charged

Dempsey With

three counts petit theft. (R., pp.36-41

each count.

(Tr.,

p.662, L.24

—

.)

eight counts 0f burglary,

After a

trial,

the jury found

p.668, L.20; Aug.1, pp.76-91.)

ﬁve counts 0f grand

theft,

and

Dempsey guilty as charged on
The

district court

imposed an

aggregate uniﬁed 14-year sentence With ﬁve years ﬁxed, With each 0f the sentences running
concurrently with each other. (R., pp.137-141; Tr., p.734, L.12

hearing conducted over two days (TL, p.747, L.4

—

— p.746,

L.4.) After a restitution

p.876, L.7), the district court ordered

cumulative restitution in the amount 0f $124,339.012 t0 ﬁve of the Victims (Aug, pp.1

Dempsey timely

1

1-1 19).

appealed. (R., pp. 1 89- 1 9 1 .)

The Idaho Supreme Court granted Dempsey’s motion

jury verdict forms, jury instructions,

with the underlying
2

1

trial

augment the appellate record with the
restitution order and exhibits, and other documents associated
to

proceeding. (7/ 1 6/ 1 9 Order.)

This amount 0f $124,339.01 reﬂects the

amended restitution order in which
Victims by $500.00. (Aug, p.1 18.)

district court’s

court reduced the original restitution award t0 one of the

the

ISSUES
Dempsey

states the issues

on appeal

as:

Was there sufﬁcient evidence t0 convict Ms. Dempsey 0f Count XII, Grand

I.

Theft?

Did the

II.

State

commit prosecutorial misconduct

in closing

Did the district court err in awarding restitution where
was not based on substantial and competent evidence?

III.

arguments?

the

amount ordered

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

The
1.

2.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Dempsey failed to demonstrate that the
her conviction for grand theft, Count XII?
Has Dempsey

failed to demonstrate

state

presented insufﬁcient evidence t0 support

fundamental error With respect t0 her assertions 0f

prosecutorial misconduct occurring during closing argument?

3.

With

Yuki Cook, has Dempsey
ordering her t0 pay restitution

the exception of certain restitution ordered t0 be paid to

failed to

show

in the ordered

that the district court

amounts?

abused

its

discretion in

ARGUMENT
I.

Dempsey Has

Failed

To Demonstrate That The

State Presented Insufﬁcient Evidence

Her Conviction For Grand
A.

Theft,

T0 Support

Count XII

Introduction

Dempsey contends
for grand theft,

that the state presented insufﬁcient evidence t0 support her conviction

Count XII. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.6-8.) Speciﬁcally,

Dempsey asserts that the

state

did not present sufﬁcient evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that the value of the

stolen property

— World War II mementos and jewelry — was over

2407(1)(b)(1).

(Id.)

$ 1 ,000 as required

by I.C.

A review 0f the record reveals that Dempsey’s claim fails because the

§ 18-

state

presented sufﬁcient evidence t0 support the conviction.

B.

Standard

An

Of Review

appellate court Will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

if there is substantial

evidence upon Which a rational

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State

V.

State V. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761,

trier

inferences t0 be

verdict

of fact could have found the essential

955 P.2d

State V. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292,

Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct. App. 1992);

735 P.2d 1070, 1072

(Ct.

App. 1987).

In conducting this review, the appellate court will not substitute

as t0 the credibility

upon a jury

of Witnesses, the weight

drawn from the evidence.

t0

View

for that of the jury

m

be given t0 the testimony, or the reasonable

m,

Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001

its

131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607;

(Ct.

App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho

at

761, 735

P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences t0 be drawn from those facts, are construed in
favor of upholding the jury’s verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho

at

761, 735 P.2d at 1072.

The Evidence Presented Was Sufﬁcient To Support Dempsev’s Conviction For Grand
Theft Count XII

C.

A person is guilty of grand theft when she commits theft as deﬁned in the Idaho Code and
when the
are

value of the property taken exceeds $1,000. LC. § 18-2407(1)(b)(1). If the stolen items

of a lesser value, the offense

of the

theft statute, “value”

is petit theft,

a misdemeanor.

I.C. § 18-2407(2).

means “the market value 0f the property

at the

For purposes

time and place 0f the

crime, 0r if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost 0f replacement of the property within

a reasonable time after the crime.”

LC.

§

18-2402(1

ascertained under the standards 0f LC. §

18-24020

LC.

To meet

be $1,000 or

less.

§

18-2402(1

1)(c).

1)(a).

1)(a),

its

If

no value can be

then the property’s value

satisfactorily

is

deemed

to

burden, the state does not need t0 establish

the actual value of the stolen property, but only that the actual value property, whatever precisely

that value,

exceeded $ 1 ,000.

“[I]t is settled in

as to

its

Idaho

that, in civil actions, the

owner of property

is

competent to

market value Without qualifying the owner as an expert witness. Idaho courts

apply the same rule in criminal proceedings, as other jurisdictions have.”

September 2019) (“Further, the owner’s opinion as

property can be substantial evidence 0f an item’s worth.

.

.

should

State V. Vandenacre,

131 Idaho 507, 509-510, 960 P.2d 190, 192-193 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted);
C.J.S. § 174 (updated

.

testify

ﬂ alﬂ 52B

t0 the value

of stolen

An owner may estimate the worth of his

0r her stolen property, and the jury

must consider the weight of the owner’s testimony”)

omitted); 37 A.L.R.2d 967, §2[a] (“Professor

Wigmore,

in

What

is

one of the most frequently

quoted and cited texts on the subject, says in his Evidence, 3d ed

whether he

article,

estimate

its

is

716: ‘The owner 0f an

§

generally familiar with such values 0r not ought certainly to be allowed to

worth; the weight 0f his testimony (Which often would be triﬂing)

and Courts have usually made no obj ections

jury;

(citations

“Moreover, when considering

trial

to this policy.

9”
)

may be

left t0

the

(emphasis in original.)

evidence, jurors are permitted to take into account

matters 0f common knowledge and experience.” State V. Neyhart, 160 Idaho 746, 752, 378 P.3d

1045, 1051 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing State V. Espinoza, 133 Idaho 618, 622, 990 P.2d 1229, 1233

(Ct.

App. 1999)); see also State

that

we

V.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 566, 199 P.3d 123, 141 (2008) (noting

“expect jurors t0 bring With them t0 jury service their background, knowledge and

experience” and

“we encourage

(internal quotation

jurors t0 use their life experiences

marks omitted)). “A jury

is

entitled t0

Count XII, Dempsey was charged With grand

evaluating testimony”

draw any reasonable inferences from

the evidence presented.” State V. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 38,

In

When

909 P.2d 647, 656

(Ct.

App. 1996).

theft for taking “several pieces ofj ewelry,

jewelry boxes, purses, and/or other household items, from Joanne Colwell, the owner thereof,

Where the value of said property exceeded $ 1 ,000.”

(R., p.39.)

The jury was instructed consistently

with the law concerning grand theft as set forth above. (Aug, pp.52, 65.)

At

the

trial,

Colwell testiﬁed about returning to her

and taking stock 0fthe

state

ofher house.

had been taken out of dressers

(T12,

in the master

p.276, L.4

home

— p.277,

after she

had been burglarized

L.17.) Colwell

bedroom and dumped, and

saw that drawers

that her jewelry

box was

gone.

(Tr.,

p.277, L.21

—

Colwell testiﬁed that the box had been “stuffed” with

p.278, L.4.)

jewelry and mementos that included some related t0 her parents’ experiences during World

and World

War

II.

(Tr.,

War mementos was

p.278, Ls.1 1-19.) Colwell testiﬁed the value 0f the jewelry and

“6 to 10,000 perhaps,

also described a porcelain

bowl

that

I

don’t know.” (Tr., p.278, L.20

belonged

t0 her great

— p.279,

L.

1 .)

War I
World

Colwell

grandmother that was also taken, but

did not testify about the value 0f the bowl. (Tr., p.279, Ls.2-7.)

Colwell’s testimony about the value of the stolen property, though brief, was sufﬁcient to
support the grand theft conviction.

about the items’ value

0n the topic

First,

notable that

Dempsey did not object t0 the testimony

(ﬂ TL, p.278, L.20 — 279, L.1), nor did Dempsey cross-examine Colwell

(ﬂ Tr., p.288, Ls.1-20).

about the value 0f her

it is

own property.

property’s value and the jury

was

Therefore, the jury was simply

left

with Colwell’s testimony

Colwell was competent t0 provide an estimate 0f the stolen
entitled t0 consider

it.

Idaho Code § 18-7001 does not

necessarily require the state t0, for example, provide an appraised value for each stolen item. Such

a requirement would be unnecessary and excessively burdensome in most cases. Further, the 10W-

end 0f Colwell’s estimate 0f the property’s value, $6,000,

ﬁnd was proven
The

in order to conclude that

state also notes that

State’s Exhibit 19,

Which appears

Dempsey was

is

six times the

amount the jury had

to

guilty of grand theft.

during Colwell’s testimony, the state admitted into evidence
to

be a

but later recovered and returned t0 her.

list

(E

0f property that was stolen from Colwell’s residence
Tr.,

p.284, L.19

— p.285, L285,

L.15.)

The

state is

unable to positively identify State’s Exhibit 19 in the “Exhibits” pdf. ﬁle associated with this
appeal.

(E generally Exhibits.)

“[A]ny missing portions of the record are presumed

t0 support

the trial court’s ruling.” State V.

However, the

upon Colwell’s

for items that

were not recovered. (Aug.,

restitution hearing testimony

at that hearing.

(TL, p.756, L.14

and a

p.1 18.) This

theft loss statement that

— p.757, L.11;

(Ct.

App. 1999).

ordered Colwell restitution in the

state notes that after the trial, the district court

amount 0f $13,184.00

evidence

Mugphy, 133 Idaho 489, 494, 988 P.2d 715, 720

amount was based

was admitted

Exhibits, pp.181-183.)

into

Therefore,

it

appears likely that the jury received evidence, perhaps through State’s Exhibit 19, that the value

0f the stolen property — recovered and unrecovered —far exceeded $1,000.

Under these circumstances, Dempsey has

failed t0

show that a rational juror could not have

found that the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000.
evidence

is

That

is

particularly so

Where the

m

construed in favor 0f the prosecution, reasonable inferences are drawn in favor 0f

upholding the jury’s verdict, and substantial evidence

is

sufﬁcient to d0 so.

ﬂ

Kuzmichev, 132 Idaho 536, 545, 976 P.2d 462, 471 (1999). This Court must therefore afﬁrm the
jury’s guilty verdict and

Dempsey’s conviction

for grand theft,

Count XII.

II.

Dempsey Has

Failed

To Demonstrate Fundamental

A.

To Her Assertions Of
Argument

Error With Respect

Prosecutorial Misconduct Occurring During Closing

Introduction

Dempsey contends

that the prosecutor

closing and rebuttal argument of the underlying

t0 object to

committed misconduct
trial.

in various respects during

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-24.)

any 0f the alleged instances 0f misconduct.

(E

id.)

Dempsey failed

A review of the record and of

the context of the prosecutor’s challenged statements, as well as the substantial evidence 0f

Dempsey’s

guilt presented at trial, reveals that

ﬁmdamental

constitutional error with respect t0

Standard

B.

Dempsey has
any of her

failed t0

meet her burden

to establish

assertions.

Of Review

“[T]he standard 0f review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends 0n

whether

the

defendant

objected

t0

the

misconduct

147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2008).
allegedly improper closing arguments
prosecutorial misconduct only

t0 the level

of fundamental

by

trial.”

State

If a defendant fails t0 timely object at trial t0

the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises

State V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226,

245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs Where the prosecutor “so infect[s] the

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”

127 P.3d 212, 221

set forth

with unfairness

t0 secure a verdict

said that “[p]r0secut0ria1

0n any factor other than the law

by the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable

may be drawn from

(2019) (quoting State

V.

that evidence.”

With respect

State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115,

Bernal, 164 Idaho 190, 196, 427 P.3d

Idaho 386, 440, 348 P.3d

States

trial

State V. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 3 1 8,

The Idaho Supreme Court has

App. 2005).

(Ct.

misconduct occurs When the State attempts

that

Severson,

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Fundamental Error During The Closing Argument

C.

as t0

V.

the prosecutor, the conviction Will be set aside for

upon a showing by

error.

at

1,

inferences

_, 443 P.3d 129,

136

7 (2018); State V. Abdhullah, 158

55 (2015)).

t0 prosecutorial

Supreme Court has

1,

as

stated:

misconduct in the context of closing argument, the United

Isolated passages 0f a prosecutor’s argument, billed in advance to the jury

d0 not reach the same proportions [as
may have a signiﬁcant impact 0n a
Such arguments, like all closing arguments 0f counsel, are

as a matter 0f opinion not of evidence,

consistent and repeated misrepresentation that
jury’s deliberations].

seldom carefully constructed

in toto before the event; improvisation frequently

and meaning

While these
general observations in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest
that a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark
t0 have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging

results in syntax left imperfect

less than crystal clear.

interpretations.

Donnellv V. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-647 (1974).

The Idaho Supreme Court has
arguments in

light

also reiterated the importance of reviewing closing

must keep

prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court]

M, 144

in

mind

the realities 0f trial.”

Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State

428, 725 P.2d 128, 132-133 (1986)).
right to

V. Estes,

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals has

due process does not guarantee a defendant an error—free

111 Idaho 423, 427-

further recognized “[t]he

trial

but a

fair

one,” and the

“not t0 discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but t0 ensure that

ﬁmction of appellate review

is

any such misconduct did not

interfere with the defendant’s right t0 a fair trial.” State V.

120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008

Where

a

claim

of

contemporaneous objection
150 Idaho

at

means

is

the record

(Ct.

Reﬂolds,

App. 1991).
unpreserved

by a

presented on appeal, the Court applies a three step review.

PC_rry,

including

error,

228, 245 P.3d at 980.

constitutional rights

m

0f their improvisational nature, noting that “in reviewing allegations 0f

First, the

were violated.”

Li.

prosecutorial

appellant must

misconduct,

show

that

“one or more

unwaived

Second, “the error must be clear or obvious.” Li. “This

must contain evidence 0f the error and the record must

10

also contain evidence as

to

whether 0r not

_, 443 P.3d
was

trial

at 133.

strategic, the

counsel

made

claim

factual in nature

is

Li.

[his or her] substantial rights.”

trial

trial,

165 Idaho

at

“Ifthe record does not contain evidence regarding whether counsel’s decision

for post—conviction relief.”

was a

m,

a tactical decision in failing to object.”

the appellant

and thus more appropriately addressed Via a petition

Finally, the appellant

Pe_rry,

must show

150 Idaho

“must demonstrate

that the error affected

226, 245 P.3d at 978. Where, as here, there

at

that the clear error

“must have affected the outcome of the

proceedings.” Li. The Idaho Supreme Court has recently clariﬁed that “[w]hether the error

proceedings must be clear from the appellate record.”

affected the

trial

443 P.3d

133-134.

at

In this case,

Dempsey

asserts that the prosecutor

m,

committed misconduct

165 Idaho

at

_,

rising to the level

0f fundamental error with respect to numerous challenged portions 0f the prosecutor’s closing and
rebuttal arguments. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-24.)

0f misconduct, Dempsey deprived the

By not obj ecting t0 any ofthese alleged instances

district court

of the opportunities to rule on any objections,

ask the prosecutor t0 clarify her remarks, 0r issue a curative instruction

Reviewed

in this context,

three prongs of the PeJrr

clear

Dempsey has

failed t0

fundamental error

test.

meet her

Speciﬁcally,

and obvious constitutional error With respect

affected the

state (as

outcome 0f the

trial

substantial

to

burden

Dempsey has

any of her

deemed

necessary.

t0 satisfy

any 0f the

if

failed to demonstrate

assertions; or that

any error

proceedings in light 0f the evidence 0f her guilt presented by the

summarized below).
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The Prosecutor’s Statements About Keeping The Community Safe And Holding

1.

Dempsey Accountable
In the ﬁrst challenged portion ofthe state’s closing argument, the prosecutor: (1) Discussed

how

at least

two of the burglaries involved an

“a part 0f the
to not

home

that is

supposed

t0

intrusion into a residential bedroom, “a safe space,”

be sacrosanct, that

is

supposed

to

be

safe, that is

be violated by a stranger” (TL, p.621, L.23 — p.622, L.5; p.627, Ls.4-13);

the Victims

were “[i]nsecure

in their

own homes,” and

“[g]et emotional

(2)

When they

supposed

Described

how

see pictures of

what happened t0 their home on the day 0f burglary;” and how “[y]ou cannot recover irreplaceable
family heirlooms that have been handed

Described

how

down through

generations” (TL, p.636, Ls.9-15); (3)

the Victims “are never ever going t0 forget the

day they walked

into their

homes

and found out that they had been violated,” and “are never going t0 stop wondering Why the garage
door

is

open when they thought they shut

it”

(TL, p.636, L.19

— p.637,

L.4); (4)

“[W]e need t0 protect the community,” and that “[W]e need t0 protect

that

work

in” (TL, p.637, Ls.9-12);

and

(4)

Asked

Informed the jury

this place

we

live

and

the jury to “hold the defendant accountable,” and

explained that “[w]e are in a unique opportunity to hold someone accountable that will hopefully

tell

the rest of the country that this

On

appeal,

is

not okay”

Dempsey contends

(T12,

p.637, Ls. 12-18; p.638, Ls.6-7).

that the prosecutor

committed fundamental error by

appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury in asking them to protect the community and

hold

Dempsey

accountable.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-16.)

A

review of the statements in the

context of the entire closing argument and the evidence presented against

Dempsey

reveals that

the statements, while perhaps inadvisable, did not constitute a clear constitutional due process

12

Violation and did not impact the

outcome of the

meet her burden of satisfying the

Dempsey overstates
Dempsey

trial

PC_rry standard

proceeding.

Dempsey has

therefore failed t0

and demonstrating ﬁmdamental

error.

her assertion in contending that “the prosecutor sought t0 convict Ms.

not on the proof adduced

the prosecutor told the jury they

but through the jury’s passions and prejudices

at trial,

must convict Ms. Dempsey

(Appellant’s brief, p.12 (capitalization modiﬁed).)

t0

keep

The prosecutor’s

their

community

when
safe.”

brief statements about

keeping the community safe were preceded and followed by a thorough, detailed, and accurate

summary 0fthe facts

set forth

ofDempsey’s

guilt. (Tr.,

p.612, L.17

— p.638,

L.9.)

The prosecutor

concluded by argument by asking the jury t0 “review the evidence” and return a verdict of guilty.
(TL, p.638, Ls.7-9.) The prosecutor did not expressly argue that the jury should convict on any

improper basis, or ask the jury
distinct

from Dempsey’s

guilt.

to, for

example, “send a message” and convict for some reason

These comments of the prosecutor, therefore, are simply not so

egregious as to constitute fundamental error.

E

State V. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330, 343,

297 P.3d

1147, 1160 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that prosecutor’s statement about holding the defendant

accountable did “not approach the level 0f egregiousness necessary t0 constitute fundamental
error”

where prior

to

and

after the challenged statements, prosecutor clearly

sought conviction 0n

the evidence presented).

2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Bolster The

Credibility

Of Any

State

Witnesses
Closing argument should not include counsel’s personal opinions and beliefs about the
credibility

0f a Witness 0r the

guilt 0r

innocence 0f the accused. State

13

V. Phillips,

144 Idaho 82,

86, 156 P.3d 583,

587

(Ct.

App. 2007).

P.2d 146, 148-149 (1979); State

may

the defendant

Priest,

also State V. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-111,

128 Idaho

6,

909 P.2d 624, 632

14,

Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 376, 707 P.2d 484, 487

1995); State V.

attorney

V.

E

(Ct.

App. 1985).

A

(Ct.

594

App.

prosecuting

express an opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity of testimony or the guilt 0f

when such opinion

is

based upon the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise

caution t0 avoid interj ecting his 0r her personal belief and should explicitly state that the opinion

is

based solely on inferences from evidence presented

P.3d

at

587

n.

at trial.

Dempsey

meet her burden

t0 demonstrate

n. 1,

156

(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-18.)

fundamental

at 0r

police lineup, had

that

two of the individuals Who had

near the scene of two of the burglaries, and

no motive to

the prosecutor argued that

On

failed to

error.

During her closing argument, the prosecutor argued

lose anything but

However, Dempsey has

of

The Prosecutor’s Statements About Mikki Zito And Marty Siegwein Not
Having A “Dog In The Fight”

a.

Ls. 10-12.)

86

asserts that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility

state witnesses in three respects.

Dempsey

at

1

In this case,

seen

Mg, 144 Idaho

who

later

identiﬁed her from a

fabricate their identiﬁcations. (TL, p.635, Ls.10-12.) Speciﬁcally,

Mikki Zito “has n0 dog

in the

ﬁght” and that Marty Siegwein “didn’t

ﬁxing a couple of doors,” and thus also had “[n]o dog in the ﬁght.” (TL, p.635,
appeal,

Dempsey contends

bolstering. (Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

that these

remarks constituted improper witness

Dempsey’s contention

14

fails.

The prosecutor did not improperly bolster the credibility of Zito’s and Siegwein’s
testimony. She did not suggest that Zito and Siegwein should be believed for some reason divorced
from the evidence presented at trial. Instead, the prosecutor presented proper argument as to why
Zito’s and Siegwein’s identification could be believed based upon evidence presented at trial.
Zito was not a victim in the case. At the trial, Zito testified that as she was driving by Tony
Ullrich’s and Christie Baturel’s residence, she noticed that their vehicle was not present, but that
a vehicle that she did not recognize was parked in front of the house. (Tr., p.166, L.16 – p.168,
L.19.) Zito also observed a woman walking from the house towards the car while holding a
handful of papers. (Tr., p.168, Ls.7-13.) Zito contacted police and identified Dempsey as the
woman she saw. (Tr., p.170, L.3 – p.171, L.18.) Dempsey was ultimately charged with burglary
and grand theft for entering and stealing property from Ullrich’s and Baturel’s residence. (R.,
pp.37, 39.)
Martin Siegwein testified that he resided in Elmore County, and also owned another
residence in which Christopher Zupsic resided. (Tr., p.177, L.16 – p.178, L.11.) Siegwein testified
that in April 2017, he responded to a knock at his door where he made contact with a woman whom
he later identified in a police lineup as Dempsey. (Tr., p.178, L.12 – p.179, L.10; p.180, Ls.2-17.)
Dempsey told Siegwein that her father was looking to buy property. (Tr., p.179, Ls.3-10.)
Siegwein testified that sometime later he saw a vehicle resembling Dempsey’s vehicle driving in
a direction away from Zupsic’s residence. (Tr., p.180, L.23 – p.181, L.21.) Siegwein drove to
Zupsic’s residence and observed that the garage door was open. (Tr., p.181, L.24 – p.182, L.10.)
Siegwein later learned that the back door had been kicked in. (Tr., p.183, Ls.1-15.) Dempsey
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was ultimately charged with burglary and

petit theft for entering

and stealing property from

Zupsic’s residence. (R., pp.37, 40.)

Thus, just as the prosecutor argued, Zito and Siegwein did not have “a dog in the ﬁght,”
least relative t0 the Victims in this case.

evidence presented
Therefore,

at trial,

Dempsey has

Siegwein was improper,
affected the

outcome of the

fundamental error

test

b.

This was an argument about credibility based upon the

not an improper bolstering of Zito’s and Siegwein’s credibility.

failed t0 demonstrate that the prosecutor’s

let

at

argument about Zito and

alone that her statements constitutes clear constitutional error and

trial

proceedings.

With respect to

Dempsey

has therefore failed t0 satisfy the PC_rry

this assertion.

The Prosecutor’s Statement That She Found One Of Dempsev’s Assertions
At Closing Argument “A Little Disturbing”

During his closing argument, Dempsey argued that the investigating detective in the case

may have inﬂuenced the
Now,
pack.

witness identiﬁcations of Dempsey. Counsel argued:

there

were three identiﬁcations made from

And I am not going t0

State’s Exhibit

actually touch the exhibit but

is

1,

the six

0n the top of the stack

here and the prosecutor showed that to you repeatedly during her presentation.

Who

prepared that?

It

was prepared, according

to Detective Parlin,

by an

agency, the state police, Where they collect similar photographs and put them
together in a pack that

is

not suggestive 0f Who

it is

that they

want

t0

ﬁnd

all

a person

0f interest when that gets shown t0 the witnesses.
It was Detective Parlin. And What
He knew who he was looking for. He knew
that Marissa Dempsey was number two. And the signiﬁcance of that is it is also
human nature, you can’t help but indicate, When you are looking for an answer,
what the answer is that you want. This is why when they are doing studies of new
medications, et cetera, the doctor Who is giving out the new medication or the

But who showed

is

that to the witnesses?

different about Detective Parlin?

16

placebo doesn’t know which one he is giving out because they don’t want to suggest
to people what he answer is.
Now, Detective Parlin testified that the three witnesses who identified
picture number two as being the person that they saw or spoke to, he said that they
identified her. He didn’t give any of the details as to how that identification came
about, whether anybody hesitated, whether anybody may have though, okay, maybe
it is number two or maybe it is number six and he directed them to correct one or
any of those details. We also didn’t get any of those details from the person who
identified on the witness stand that number two was the person that they saw.
(Tr., p.649, L.2 – p.650, L.14.)
In her rebuttal argument, in response to Dempsey’s contention about Detective Parlin, the
prosecutor stated:
I frankly find it a little disturbing that Detective Parlin, who has explained
to you his training and experience, is being accused of witness tampering. That he
is being accused of pointing out whom he wants an eye witness to identify. And I
find it disturbing that the three people, again, two of which had no dog in the fight
whatsoever really, one that lost 20 bucks worth of coins, their honesty and their
integrity who identified her from the lineup is being questioned.
(Tr., p.657, Ls.10-20.)
On appeal, Dempsey points to the prosecutor’s phrasing that she found the implications of
a portion of the defense argument “disturbing” and contends that the prosecutor “put the weight of
the office behind these witnesses’ testimony, telling the jury that she was personally offended that
their credibility would be challenged.” (Appellant’s brief, p.17.) Dempsey however, has failed
to establish fundamental error.
The prosecutor was entitled to challenge and attempt to nullify the inferences that could be
drawn from Dempsey’s assertions about the manner in which the lineups were deployed and the
identifications made.

Ultimately, the prosecutor challenged and attempted to nullify such

17

inferences not through the “weight of the ofﬁce,” but with reference to the Detective Parlin’s

testimony about his training and experience.
information about the process deployed
p.349,

L20; p.377, L.16 — p.378, L3.)

response t0 perceived inferences

made

When

Detective Parlin’s testimony also included

“six pack” lineups are utilized. (TL, p.347, L.13

The prosecutor appeared
in the defense

to

—

be expressing an unplanned

argument rather than making choreographed

appeal t0 obtain a guilty verdict 0n some improper basis.

While the prosecutor should have

perhaps refrained from even alluding to any personal beliefs and opinions regarding Dempsey’s
defense,

clear

Dempsey cannot meet her burden under the Pe_rry fundamental

and obvious constitutional

c.

error standard t0 establish

error.

The Prosecutor’s Statement, “I Don’t Believe The Evidence Showed That
A11 Four Of Those People Are Lying About That Eve Witness
Identiﬁcation”

In the ﬁnal challenged portion of the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, following her

initial

response to Dempsey’s argument that the lineup identiﬁcations

inaccurate, the prosecutor continued, “I don’t believe the evidence

people are lying about that eye Witness identiﬁcation.”

Dempsey, pointing

(Tr.,

may have been

showed

tainted 0r

that all four those

p.657, Ls.21-23.)

On

appeal,

to the prosecutor’s “I don’t believe” phrasing, asserts that the prosecutor

improperly expressed her personal opinion. (Appellant’s

brief, pp.17-18.)

Because closing argument should not include counsel’s personal opinions and beliefs about
the credibility of a Witness or the guilt 0r innocence of the accused,

it is

the safer course to avoid

phrases such as “I think,” or “I believe” altogether. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 n.
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1,

156 P.3d

at

587

n. 1; State V.

Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 131, 714 P.3d 93, 100 (Ct. App. 1986). However, such

phrases d0 not infringe upon a defendant’s right t0 a fair

evidence

is

being recited or inferences being urged, 0r

trial

When they do

the prosecutor t0 use his 0r her ofﬁcial position or personal

inducing the jury t0 vote for conviction.
also State V. Blanche,

ﬂ

Where they appear

in contexts

not manifest any attempt by

knowledge of the case

Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho

where

at 131,

696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn. 2005) (concluding

as a

714 P.3d

means 0f

at 100;

that 18 statements

by

ﬂ
the

prosecutor such as “I suggest to you,” “I ask you,” and “I submit to you,” were “poorly chosen,”

but did not constitute plain error); State

V.

Hoffman, 804 P.2d 577, 600 (Wash. 1991) (A

prosecutor’s use 0f such phrases as “I think” or “I think the evidence shows” did not constitute the

improper expression of personal opinions where they were supported by the evidence and could

have been cured through instruction had there been an objection.)
Here,

Dempsey cannot show,

error analysis, a clear

as she

is

required t0 do the context 0f a

and obvious constitutional due process

Violation.

m

fundamental

Instead, the prosecutor’s

phrasing and statement can easily be construed as a casually-constructed response to Dempsey’s
challenge t0 the eyewitness identiﬁcations, rather than an attempt to utilize any personal

knowledge 0f the case to
This

is

interject a personal opinion

and obtain a conviction on an improper basis.

particularly true considering the challenged statement itself refers t0 the prosecutor’s lack

of “belief” being based upon What the “evidence showed.” (TL, p.657, Ls.21-23.) Dempsey has
therefore failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct, let alone a clear and obvious constitutional

61'1'01'.
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A Review Of The Evidence Of Dempsev’s Guilt Further Demonstrates That She Has Failed

3.

To Demonstrate Fundamental

Error With Respect

To Her

Prosecutorial Misconduct

Allegations

Dempsey’s misconduct claims must be analyzed

by the

state at trial.

The

strength of the state’s case

is

in the context of the evidence presented

relevant to each of Dempsey’s prosecutorial

misconduct claims, both in terms 0f an analysis of Whether Dempsey has satisﬁed the third

prong and proved that any misconduct affected the outcome of the

trial

Pe_rry

proceedings; and also

whether the challenged statements constituted a clear and obvious Violation 0f Dempsey’s
constitutional

due process right

t0 a fair trial.

This considerable evidence of Dempsey’s guilt

is

best summarized as the prosecutor did

during closing argument and as the detective did in building the case — Viewing at the eight
burglaries as a Whole and “connecting the dots” in terms

ofhow the evidence ofDempsey’s crimes”

overlapped between the various Victims. This overlapping evidence included: (1)

Dempsey being

identiﬁed by eyewitnesses at or near the scene of three of the burglaries (TL, p.166, L.16

L23;

p.178, L.1

— p.180, L.17; p.377, L.16 — p.379, L7);

homes were recovered from Dempsey’s

storage shed,

Jamie Shores (Dempsey’s boyfriend’s brother,
several burglaries) (T12, p.327, L.21

L23;

p.361, L.22

— p.362,

a pattern (TL, p.343, L.20
that she

was

in

L.8);

(3)

— p.344,

— p.329,

(2) stolen items

Dempsey’s

whom Dempsey

L.18; p.332, L.10

vehicle,

— p.170,

from the burglarized

and a vehicle belong

t0

admitted t0 accompanying on

— p.333, L.23; p.351, L.21 — p.358,

missing pillowcases from several the residences establishing

L.2):

and

Elmore County 0n April

(4)

recovered text messages from

27th, the date

0f several of the burglaries

despite her contrary interview statements and trial testimony that she

20

Dempsey indicating

was

(R., 37-39.)

in Boise the entire

day

(TL, p.501, L.15
p.654, L.24

— p.502,

— p.659, L. 1 9

L.16; p.567, L.11

— p.575,

L.1

1;

ﬂ alﬂ

(prosecutor summarizing evidence

Tr.,

p.612, L.11

ofDempsey’s

—

p.638, L.9;

guilt during her closing

and rebuttal arguments).)
Other evidence proved Dempsey’s
in her trial testimony, that she

had served

guilt.

Dempsey admitted

as a lookout during burglaries with

p.327, Ls.10-14; p.444, Ls.5-13; p.461, Ls.9-18).

Dempsey performed

internet searches

t0 investigating ofﬁcers,

t0 tell if

really is gold,” “gold ring that says Taiwan,” locations of Coinstar machines,

sell

burglaries,

your jewelry

and Where one can

gold and silver in Boise and Nampa. (TL, p.500, L.6 — p.504, L.4; Exhibits, pp.40-145.) The

jury also had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility 0f Dempsey’s
this

Jamie Shores. (TL,

Near the dates 0f several 0f the

from her phone concerning, “[h]ow

and

evidence 0f guilt,

Dempsey cannot not demonstrate

either violated her constitutional

due process right

trial

testimony. In light of

that the challenged prosecutor statements

to a fair trial, 0r affected the

outcome of the

trial.

Finally,

make

did not

misconduct.

Dempsey

has also failed t0 meet her burden t0 demonstrate that the

trial

counsel

a tactical decision in declining t0 object t0 the alleged instances of prosecutorial

E m,

165 Idaho

at

_, 443 P.3d

at 133.

For the reasons discussed above, none

0f the challenged prosecutor statements were prejudicial to Dempsey, and therefore defense
counsel

may have

declined t0 call additional attention to them.

Reviewed in the context of the overwhelming evidence of her guilt and the
in

Which the prosecutor summarized this evidence

21

in her closing

detailed

manner

and rebuttal arguments, Dempsey

has failed to meet her substantial burden to satisfy any of the three prongs 0f the
error test.

She has therefore

Pegy fundamental

failed t0 establish reversible error.

III.

With The Exception Of Certain Restitution Ordered T0 Be Paid To Yuki Cook, Dempsey Has
Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ordering Her T0 PaV
Restitution In The Ordered Amounts
A.

Introduction

Dempsey contends

that the district court

abused

discretion in

its

determinations. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-31.) Speciﬁcally,

making

Dempsey challenges

its

restitution

the amounts, 0r

portions ofthe amounts, rewarded t0: (1) Joanne Colwell for stolen stock and marriage certiﬁcates;

(2)

Sharon Grinde-Ash for stolen jewelry;

electronics;

and

(4)

Yuki Cook

(3) Victims Christie Batruel

for various stolen items. (Id.)

and Tony Ullrich for stolen

A review of the record reveals that

with the limited exception of certain items stolen from Yuki Cook, the
within

its

discretion in ordering

Dempsey to pay restitution

in the ordered

district court

acted well

amounts with respect

to

these Victims.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The decision regarding whether
district court’s discretion,”

to order restitution,

1)).

in

what amount,

is

guided by factors in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7). State

158 Idaho 569, 573, 349 P.3d 423, 427 (2015) (citing State

P.3d 398, 401 (201

and

V.

V. Hurles,

Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249

“The determination 0f the amount 0f restitution
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within the

is

a question 0f fact for the

trial

whose ﬁndings

court

State v.

be disturbed

if

supported by substantial evidence.”

Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192

The

C.

will not

District

Court Acted Well Within

Its

(Ct.

I_d.

(citing

App. 2010)).

Discretion In Awarding Restitution In

The

Ordered Amounts
Pursuant to LC.

economic

loss

§

19-5304(2), the district court

Which the Victim of a crime actually

is

authorized t0 order restitution for any

suffers.

For purposes 0f the

restitution statute,

“economic loss” includes not only the value of property taken, destroyed or damaged, but also
expenses incurred by the Victim as a result of the criminal conduct.
court determines that an order 0f restitution

to order a defendant to

make

restitution.

preponderance of the evidence. LC.

As

competent to

testify as to its

Vandenacre, 131 Idaho

by Which
court.

at

also State V.

Lombard, the

(trial

required

that, in civil actions, the

owner of property

is

market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness.”
at

192-193 (citations omitted). Further, the method

amount

used an alternative method
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discretion

When

it

calculated the

amount of

restitution owed for the property stolen by defendant by using the ascertained retail value of that
property.)
After the jury found Dempsey guilty as charged, the parties stipulated to restitution for
some of the stolen property. (Tr., p.749, Ls.14-22; p.750, L.10 – p.752, L.20.) The district court
conducted a hearing over two days on other, disputed, restitution requests. (Tr., p.752, L.23 –
p.875, L.24.)

After the hearing was conducted, the district court entered an order requiring

Dempsey to pay a total of $124,339.01 for losses suffered in five of the burglaries. (Aug., pp.111118.) In the order, the court recited and applied the proper law and standards applicable to criminal
restitution awards. (Aug., pp.111-112.) The court also expressly recognized its discretionary
authority to calculate an appropriate restitution amount for each loss, as well as the statutory
limitations to that authority. (Id.)
On appeal, Dempsey challenges $33,716.06 of this $124,339.01 restitution award.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.24-31.) Dempsey contends that the district court abused its discretion in
rewarding this amount because the losses, she asserts, constituted uncompensable “future losses”
and/or the state provided insufficient evidence supporting the challenged amounts. However, a
review of the record reveals that with the limited exception of certain items stolen from Yuki Cook,
the district court reasonably considered the testimony and evidence presented to it and made
restitution determinations that fell well within its broad statutory authority.
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1.

$1,135 Restitution To Colwell For Stock Certificates And Three Certified Marriage
Licenses

The district court ordered Dempsey to pay restitution to victim Joanne Colwell in the
amount of$13,184. (Aug., p.118.) This amount included $1,135 forreissuance fees for an Idaho
Power stock certificate and a certified marriage license. (Exhibits, p.182; Tr., p.760, Ls.8-24.)
Dempsey testified that she contacted Idaho Power and obtained an exact replacement cost for the
stock certificates. (Tr., p.760, Ls.14-24.) Colwell also testified that she had not yet obtained a
reissued stock certificate, but would have to eventually do so to ever sell the stocks, which she
valued at $60,000. (Tr., p.761, L.3 -p.762, L.2.) On appeal, Dempsey contends the district court
abused its discretion because Colwell had not yet actually replaced the certificate and license and
these fees were therefore "future losses" that could not be the subject of a restitution order pursuant
to LC. § 19-5304(2). (Appellant's brief, p.26.) Dempsey's assertion fails.
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides that "[r ]estitution shall be ordered for any economic
loss which the victim actually suffers."

This means that restitution cannot be awarded for

speculative or prospective losses. See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 889-890, 292 P.3d 273, 280281 (2013). However, the loss of the stock certificate and marriage license was neither speculative
nor prospective. The restitution statute does not require a crime victim to actually replace a stolen
item before receiving restitution for it-whether that be a consumer good like a vehicle or jewelry,
or a valuable document such as a stock certificate or marriage license. See LC. § 19-5304. The
public policy underlying the restitution statute "favoring full compensation to crime victims who
suffer economic loss," State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989),
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would be compromised if crime victims were not entitled to restitution awards to help them replace
items which were stolen from them.
Because the loss of the stock certificates and marriage license constituted an economic loss
which Colwell actually suffered, Dempsey has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused
its discretion in ordering her to pay restitution for the stolen stock certificates and marriage license.

2.

$2,520 Restitution To Batruel and Ullrich For Smart Phones And Laptops

The district court ordered Dempsey to pay restitution to victims Christie Batruel and Tony
Ullrich in the amount of $10,274.

(Aug., pp.113, 116.) This included $2,520 for various

electronics including smart phones and laptops. (Aug., p.116.) Batruel prepared an itemized loss
statement that was admitted into evidence listing various electronics totaling $3,150 in value. (Tr.,
p. 770, L.9 - p. 771, L.18; Exhibits, p.184.) Batruel testified that these value amounts she listed for
the electronics were the purchase amounts of those items. (Tr., p.772, Ls.10-12.) She also testified
that each of the listed electronics were between one-year old and a little over one-year old. (Tr.,
p.772, Ls.13-24.) Batruel did not provide an estimate for the value of the electronics at the time
they were stolen, explaining that she "really never buy[ s] used electronics, so I wouldn't know"
what they were worth. (Tr., p.773, Ls.13-22.)
In addition to ruling on Batruel' s other restitution requests, the district court accepted
Batruel's $3,150 cumulative purchase price of the electronics, but deducted 20% for depreciation,
resulting in a restitution award of $2,520 for the electronics. (Tr., p.790, Ls.4-12.) The court
concluded that it did "feel like the phones, even in their used condition as well as the laptop still
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had significant value." (Tr., p.790, Ls.8-10.) On appeal, Dempsey contends that the district court
abused its discretion in calculating this amount because, Dempsey asserts, the state failed to
sufficiently prove that Batruel's losses were $3,150 minus $20% depreciation. (Appellant's brief,
pp.27-29.) Dempsey's assertion fails.
While Batruel did not specifically couch her testimony regarding the purchase price of the
electronics as "market value," the district court was entitled to consider this amount as a starting
point in calculating an appropriate restitution award.

Further, while the state has identified no

Idaho case discussing a court's authority to estimate depreciation rate, the restitution statute as a
whole grants a district court "broad discretion in determining the amount of restitution to be paid
in a criminal action." State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 628, 38 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Ct. App. 2001).
It is not the common case where a crime victim will have had appraisals completed on ordinary

household items. Nor does the statute require, the state asserts, expert testimony or detailed
evidence regarding depreciation rates. See In Trevor A., 462 A.2d 1245, 1250-1251 (Md. App.
1983) (the trial court was deemed to have appropriately considered the fair market value of the
stolen items when it "properly considered the owner's testimony as to replacement value and as to
the age and condition of each item ... and then took judicial notice of appreciation
or depreciation of each item in arriving at what it considered to be fair market value.") (Citations
omitted). With no statutory or appellate controlling authority instructing it the contrary, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in utilizing an estimated depreciation rate in conjunction with the
purchase price of the electronics to calculate an appropriate restitution amount.
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3.

$6,261.06 Restitution To Grinde-Ashe For Jewelry

The district court ordered Dempsey to pay restitution to victim Sharon Grinde-Ash in the
amount of$11,511.06. (Aug., pp.113, 115.) This included $6,261.06 for stolen jewelry. (Aug.,
p.115.) Grinde-Ash prepared an itemized loss statement that was admitted into evidence listing
the jewelry and other items. (Exhibits, pp.187-188; Tr., p.794, L.13 - p.798, L.19.) In this loss
statement, Grinde-Ash estimated the total value of the jewelry at $8,700. (Exhibits, p.187.)
Grinde-Ash also submitted original receipts indicating that the jewelry had been purchased
between 2002 and 2009, and which contained the purchase and retail prices of the jewelry
(Exhibits, pp.190-197; Tr., p.807, Ls.5-16.) At the restitution hearing, Grinde-Ash testified that in
her loss statement, she estimated the jewelry to be worth somewhere between the purchase price
and the retail price at the time of the purchase. (Tr., p.813, Ls.1-18.) Grinde-Ash explained that
the purchase price was less than retail price due to certain discounts her husband received for being
a frequent shopper at the jewelry store. (Tr., p.799, Ls.18-23; p.807, L.23 - p.809, L.4.) GrindeAsh also testified that at the time it was stolen, the jewelry was all in like-new condition, and had
rarely been worn (Tr., p.800, Ls. 9-18; p.812, Ls.12-25); and that she attempted to find identical
jewelry for sale in preparation for the restitution hearing but was unsuccessful (Tr., p.809, L.12 p.810, L.2).
The district court declined to award Grinde-Ash restitution for the jewelry in the amount
she requested. (See Aug., pp.113, 115.) Instead, the court ordered restitution only in the amount
of the original out-of-pocket purchase price of the jewelry. (Id.) On appeal, Dempsey contends
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that the restitution award for the jewelry is not supported by sufficient evidence. (Appellant's
brief, pp.29-30.) Dempsey's contention fails.
The district court reasonably exercised its discretion in awarding Grinde-Ash restitution in
the amount of the original purchase price of the jewelry. See State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 703,
946 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[U]pon a showing that fair market value cannot be
established, the State may show the economic value of the loss caused by the defendant through
such factors as original purchase price ... ") If anything, this was a conservative restitution award
in light of the purchase price being so much lower than the known retail price at that time of
purchase. Ash-Grinde testified that she would be paying closer to this retail price if she was able
to purchase the same jewelry today.

(Tr., p.813, Ls.1-14.) Further, jewelry is not likely to

depreciate in value in the same manner as, for example, consumer electronics - and it may even
appreciate in value. Dempsey has therefore failed to meet her burden to demonstrate that the
district court abused its discretion.

4.

$23,800 Restitution To Cook For Various Stolen Items

The district court ordered Dempsey to pay restitution to victim Yuki Cook in the amount
of$84,000 for cash and several dozen items that were stolen from her residence. (Aug., pp.113114.) On appeal, Dempsey challenges $23,800 of the $84,000 restitution award. (Appellant's
brief, pp.30-31.) Specifically, Dempsey contends that there was insufficient evidence to support
the restitution awards for: (1) $10,000 for a Japanese coin collection; (2) $10,000 for an American
coin collection; (3) $250 for three opened bottles of perfume; and (4) $3,500 for a Chanel purse.
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(Id.) The state concedes that there was insufficient evidence to support the restitution ordered for
the two coin collections and for the three open perfume bottles. This Court should therefore
remand the case and order the district court to reduce the $84,000 restitution award to Yuki Cook
to $63,750.
At the restitution hearing, Cook testified that she lost a Chanel bag that was worth $3,500
in burglary of her residence. (Tr., p.829, Ls.14-16.) During the trial, Cook's daughter testified
that she had "looked up" the value of the Channel purse and confirmed that it was worth $3,500.
(Tr., p.206, Ls.11-14.) The district court ordered Dempsey to pay Cook this amount in restitution
for the purse. (Aug., p.114.) Because, as discussed above, see Vandenacre, 131 Idaho at 509-510,
960 P.2d at 192-193, the owner of property is competent to testify as to its market value, Cook's
testimony about the value of the purse constituted sufficient evidence to support that portion of the
district court's restitution award.
Cook also testified that in the burglary of her residence, she lost a coin collection consisting
of Japanese and American coins that she valued at $20,000 ($10,000 each). (Tr., p.838, Ls.3-11;
p.840, L.3 - p.841, L.2; p.843, L.2 - p.845, L.24.) However, Cook was unable to estimate how
many coins were stolen, identify any of the coins (except that some were 50 cent coins from the
United States), or provide any basis for her estimate of the value of the coins. (Id.) While the
owner of property is competent to testify about the property's value, the state acknowledges that
in these limited circumstances, where the property owner can only vaguely describe what the
property even was, the state has not submitted sufficient evidence to support a restitution award -
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particularly where the general category of property taken, coins, has such a wide range of possible
value.
Cook also testified that in the burglary of her residence, she lost five bottles of perfume
that she valued at $100 each. (Tr., p.828, L.25 -p.829, L.13; p.846, L.9 - p.847, L.9.) However,
Cook also acknowledged that three of the bottles (Christian Dior, Poison, and Mitsouko ), had been
opened before they were stolen. (Tr., p.846, L.9-p.847, L.9.) Cook was not able to estimate how
much of the perfume in the open bottles had been used. (Id.) The district court ordered total
restitution in the amount of $450 for the five bottles - $100 each for four of the bottles, and $50
for one of the bottles that had been opened (the Christian Dior perfume). (Aug., p.114.) The court
did not explain why it had reduced the restitution reward for one of the open bottles but not the
other two. (See id.) The state acknowledges that while there was sufficient evidence to support
the restitution award for the two unopened bottles ($200), there was not sufficient evidence to
support the restitution award for the three open bottles considering Cook did not know how much
perfume remained in each bottle.
With the exception of Yuki Cook's coin collections and unopened perfume bottles, the state
presented sufficient evidence to support the district court's challenged restitution awards.
Therefore, the state submits that this Court should order the district court to reduce its $84,000
restitution award to Yuki Cook to $63,750 (after deducting $20,000 for the coin collections and
$250 for the opened bottles of perfume), and to affirm the remainder of the district court's
restitution award.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Dempsey's judgments of convictions
and the district court's restitution order, with the limited exceptions noted above.
DATED this 5th day of November, 2019.
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